The Sixth Central Pay Commission has recommended implementation of a Performance Related Incentive Scheme (PRIS) to reward the efficient employees and improve the quality of Government work. Government departments will be allowed to retain one-half of the savings made by them as bonus to their employees. It is quite a question that how this scheme would be successful as it is difficult to estimate the savings that are made and how much will be distributed and how much will go in their pocket. Government employees are doubly benefited in this dispensation. They can opt into PRIS if they anticipate savings due to some reason; and they can opt out if they have more to gain from corruption.

The final impact of flexibility and delegation depends upon personal objective of the concerned officers. The police will use flexibility to increase their weekly extortions if their objective is personal gain. Flexibility to such SHOs will only lead to more corruption. These officers will be able to legally claim savings in addition to the bribes. By PRIS, The Pay Commission has opened a window to legalize corruption. Officers can now manipulate works and appropriate the savings legally.

An external agency will be better able to assess whether the savings made in maintenance of a road are due to higher efficiency or poor maintenance; and whether higher receipts of sand are due to efficiency or police tyranny. The Government employees would be within the parameters set by the Commission in themselves determining the savings and in appropriating them.
The Pay Commission was justified in not dwelling into the former task of making a roadmap of administrative reforms as that was the mandate of another Commission.

Incentives alone will not bring about a change in the way our Government works. The fear of punishment holds people in the path of righteousness. Spies should be appointed to watch the conduct of Government officers and they should be cross checked by appointing more spies. Mostly Government employees snatch the wealth of others and deprive them. The incentives alone will not suffice, it is simultaneously necessary to punish the wrongdoers. But the Pay Commission washes its hand from solving this vexed issue.' Performance indicators indicate whether services have improved or declined which helps identifying underperformance. Under performance would also have to be addressed and resolved specifically. The Pay Commission passes the buck of meting out punishment to the corrupt and underperformers to an unspecified and unknown entity and creates a facade as if it has sought to create efficient Government.

Corruption should be fought back by a separate spy agency that would on its own initiative trap corrupt Government officers. And provision of strict punishment for corrupt Government officers should be there like in China which will let the corrupt officers think twice. An independent agency should be set up to send confidential questionnaires to the customers of all Government departments and solicit the public’s views on the integrity and efficiency of each employee. Such an approach will help to overcome the pitfalls of such schemes like PRIS.