The controversy over the so-called special treatment given by the Sixth Pay Commission to IAS officers over the IPS and Central Secretariat services has attracted wide public attention. Strangely enough, the central issue is not the proposed pay scales, but the two-year differential between the IAS officers on the one hand and officers from the IPS and all Class I Central services for appointment in Central Secretariat jobs which has been there for about two decades under which officers of all other services are considered eligible for appointment as joint secretary, additional secretary and secretary, respectively, two years after an IAS batch had been appointed.
A separate IAS and IPS examination should be abolished and a common admission test for all services, including the IAS and the IPS should be conducted. This did away with the claim of the IAS-IFS that they had been recruited through a very special and difficult examination, while others were recruited through lesser examinations such as the Central Services Class I examination and IPS examination. Since the IAS and IPS officers were earlier recruited through a superior examination, their superiority was not questioned. It was only after the introduction of the common examination for all services, the myth of IAS superiority and their near-monopoly of Central Secretariat jobs were both vocally and seriously challenged by both IPS and Central Services officers, such as those belonging to the Audit and Accounts and revenue services.
Central Services officers argued with good reason that while they were specialists and professionals in certain disciplines, they were condemned to serving under officers who had come with experience only in state governments and moved into positions of joint secretaries and above with effortless case. This was contrary to all accepted doctrines of professionalism and specialization. IPS officers argued that they had as much or even more of district experience as IAS officers and also knew how to deal with people at the grassroots level. Common sense as well as theoretical reasoning would disfavor the two-year differential introduced to protect the interests of IAS officers and to continue their privilege of primacy in Central Secretariat appointments. On a rational examination of the pros and cons, the two-year differential seems arbitrary and unsustainable.
It is observed through experience that many of those who score higher marks in an examination early in life may not continue their pre-eminence in later years. Also, many who may not secure very high marks in that same examination become late bloomers. The latter should be given a chance in higher secretariat appointments. On the other hand, the former group must not regard the higher marks they had secured in the common examination as a passport to higher jobs for ail time to come, regardless of their performance. In that context the two-year rule becomes unsustainable unless a separate selection procedure is restored for the IAS. Alternatively, the IAS itself could be abolished, creating a common level playing field for all Central services as well as state service officials who have distinguished themselves. If the IAS has to be retained, it should therefore be on the basis of specialization and professionalism. That means reorienting the present structure somewhat on the lines of the French civil service, under which civil servants are recruited on the basis of a common examination but are there-after grouped into several divisions like economic, administration, social administration and general administration, and there is no interchange saves at the highest level and only in exceptional cases.