Every aspect of criminal justice administration is badly in need of reform. Several committees have recommended legal and institutional changes to strengthen the system. Among them, those in respect of investigation and prosecution are considered primarily significant. The Supreme Court had to direct the Centre and State governments in the Prakash Singh case (2005) to introduce police reforms urgently to save the system from total collapse.
The prosecution agency is that segment of the criminal justice system responsible for prosecuting those found by the police 10 have committed a criminal offence. The objective of the prosecution proceedings is to protect the innocent and seek conviction of the guilty. Given this dual purpose and the adversary nature of criminal proceedings, the role of the prosecutor is value-laden with notions of fairness and justice. The prosecutor is motivated neither by any sense of revenge nor commitment to get a conviction. In this sense, the impartiality of the public prosecutor (PP) is as vital and significant as the impartiality of the judge.
Normally, the PP’s role begins after the investigation agency presents the ease in court. The objective was obviously to ensure that police officers who investigated a case would have no manner of control or influence over the prosecutors. The prosecutor used to keep a close watch on the proceedings of a case, inform the jurisdictional police to produce the witnesses on the day of the trial, refresh the memory of witnesses with reference to their police state-ments and examine them at length. Thanks to close monitoring, very few witnesses turned hostile. If and when they did, the prosecutor exposed them through effective cross-examination.
Most police officers as well as some administrators and judges believe that the lack of coordination caused by the separation has resulted in falling conviction and disposal rate, filing of poorly investigated cases, indifferent management of trial proceedings including bail, and lack of effective review, particularly at the district level. There is no doubt that the police-prosecution interface is in need of immediate remedial action but giving the prosecution back to the police is neither desirable nor practical. Lack of professional competence and common among PPs and APPs is another factor contributing to the weakness of the system. There is no attempt to professionalize the prosecution service systematically. Selection is neither merit-based nor competitive. Remuneration and conditions of service arc not attractive. There is no system of education and training for prosecutors. Because of this, the morale of the service is very low and prosecutors become vulnerable to bribery and corruption.
If the prosecution at the district level is to function efficiently and impartially, it is essential not only to have a proper system of selection and training but also provide for a closer supervision and monitoring mechanism, particularly at the junior level. This would require a unified integrated structure which may be functionally separate in terms of the tasks of investigation and prosecution. To achieve mutual cooperation without subordination of one to the other and without impinging upon the independence of either, arrangement should be worked out to have a common centre of control and accountability. The failure of prosecution is not always of its own making. While it is important to select prosecutors properly and give them adequate training, and constitute an independent directorate for professionalizing the system.