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The Peace Process Rated by 1 users
Every now and then there is exchange of fire between Indian and Pakistani troops on the Line of Control (Loc).This has been described as the most serious violation of the ceasefire which had come into force in November 2003. Have you ever wondered why it is happening? There have been as many as 19 such battles albeit on a smaller scale this year alone. These are apart from the incidents like the militants barging into our territory ostensibly without facing any resistance from the neighboring country’s forces. Why is Pakistan not able to rein in its troops? Why do they occasionally indulge in misadventures? There is a theory circulating in our security circles. According to this, Pakistan wants to revive tension along the Loc to find an excuse for pulling out its troops from the Afghanistan border where it is not succeeding.
The underlying idea is to convince the United States that its attention is divided because of New Delhi’s hostile postures. On the face of it this perception does not sound very convincing. Why should a country leave a sensitive part of its borders unguarded? It will also be unfair to overlook Pakistan’s sporadic but valiant efforts to tackle the scourge of terrorism on its soil. What seems more credible, however, is that there is a powerful section in the neighboring country which does not want Pakistan to settle for peace certainly not with India and the US. Evidently it finds harmonious relations with the two countries an anathema; it is not reconciled to the restoration of democracy as well.
Although there is an ongoing debate that there should be close coordination between all intelligence agencies, placing ISI under the direct control of the interior division was never discussed. In Britain, MI-5 looks after domestic intelligence gathering while MI-6 looks after external affairs. Similarly, India’s Research and Analysis Wing (Raw) is responsible for external intelligence while the Central Bureau of Intelligence (CBI) looks after domestic j security matters, but in both the models, the spy agencies report to the chief executives which is the prime ministers. Like the British and the Indian models ISI also had a mandate to provide intelligence on domestic and strategic, external and defense-oriented issues. What was left unsaid was that Pakistan was hardly a democracy of the kind India and Britain was. Military regimes have been a rule rather than an exception in Pakistan. ISI has been a tool in the hands of Pakistani army which is averse to giving up con¬trol over it.
Apparently the last word has not been heard in this regard. Pakistan is under pressure from the US to strip ISI of its rogue elements which can be done only by taking away two of its important functions: internal security and coordination in the war on terror. It appears that the US is convinced that one reason why Pakistan is not being a useful ally in the global war against terrorism is the support being lent by a section of ISI to the militants. Many institutions are flawed and rightly vilified; however, ad hoc decision-making will not correct such structural faults. In fact, not only has the government lost yet more political capital in its ill-fated attempt to bring change, but change will be all the more difficult now that the ISI will view the government with renewed suspicion. We have to be constantly on guard even as we wholeheartedly take part in peace process.
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